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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, com-
munication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical
world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-
physical systems are prone to malicious attacks so that specific
analysis tools and monitoring mechanisms need to be developed
to enforce system security and reliability. This paper builds upon
the results presented in our companion paper [1] and proposes
centralized and distributed monitors for attack detection and
identification. First, we design optimal centralized attack detec-
tion and identification monitors. Optimality refers to the ability of
detecting (respectively identifying) every detectable (respectively
identifiable) attack. Second, we design an optimal distributed
attack detection filter based upon a waveform relaxation tech-
nique. Third, we show that the attack identification problem is
computationally hard, and we design a sub-optimal distributed
attack identification procedure with performance guarantees.
Finally, we illustrate the robustness of our monitors to system
noise and unmodeled dynamics through a simulation study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems need to remain functional and op-
erate reliably in presence of unforeseen failures and, possibly,
external attacks. Besides failures and attacks on the physical
infrastructure, cyber-physical systems are also prone to cyber
attacks against their data management, control, and communi-
cation layer [2], [3], [4], [5].
In several cyber-physical systems, including water and gas
distribution networks, electric power systems, and dynamic
Leontief econometric models, the physical dynamics include
both differential equations as well as algebraic constraints. In
[1] we model cyber-physical systems under attack by means
of linear continuous-time differential-algebraic systems; we
analyze the fundamental limitations of attack detection and
identification, and we characterize the vulnerabilities of these
systems by graph-theoretic methods. In this paper we design
monitors for attack detection and identification for the cyber-
physical model presented in [1].
Related work. Concerns about security of control, commu-
nication, and computation systems are not recent as testified
by the numerous works in the fields of fault-tolerance control
and information security. However, as discussed in [1], cyber-
physical systems feature vulnerabilities beyond fault-tolerance
control and information security methods.
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Attack detection and identification monitors have recently
been proposed. In [6], [7] monitoring procedures are designed
for the specific case of state attacks against discrete-time non-
singular systems. In [8] an algorithm to detect output attacks
against discrete-time nonsingular systems is described and
characterized. In [9] a detection scheme for replay attacks is
proposed. Fault detection and identification schemes for linear
differential-algebraic power network models are presented in
[10], [11] and in the conference version of this paper [12].
We remark that the designs in [10], [11] consider particular
known faults rather than unknown and carefully orchestrated
cyber-physical attacks. Finally, protection schemes for output
attacks against systems described by purely static models are
presented, among others, in [13], [14].
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are as
follows. First, for the differential-algebraic model of cyber-
physical systems under attacks developed in [1], we design
centralized monitors for attack detection and identification.
With respect to the existing solutions, in this paper we propose
attack detection and identification filters that are effective
against both state and output attacks against linear continuous-
time differential-algebraic cyber-physical systems. Our moni-
tors are designed by using tools from geometric control theory;
they extend the construction of [15] to descriptor systems with
direct feedthrough matrix, and they are guaranteed to achieve
optimal performance, in the sense that they detect (respectively
identify) every detectable (respectively identifiable) attack.
Second, we develop a fully distributed attack detection
filter with optimal (centralized) performance. Specifically, we
provide a distributed implementation of our centralized attack
detection filter based upon iterative local computations by
using the Gauss-Jacobi waveform relaxation technique. For
the implementation of this method, we rely upon cooperation
among geographically deployed control centers, each one
responsible for a part of the system. In particular, we require
each control center to have access to the measurements of its
local subsystem, synchronous communication among neigh-
boring control centers at discrete time instants, and ability to
perform numerical integration.
Third, we show that the attack identification problem is
inherently computationally hard. Consequently, we design a
distributed identification method that achieves identification,
at a low computational cost and for a class of attacks, which
can be characterized accurately. Our distributed identification
methods is based upon a divide and conquer procedure, in
which first corrupted regions and then corrupted components
are identified by means of local identification procedures and
cooperation among neighboring regions. Due to cooperation,
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2our distributed procedure provably improves upon the fully
decoupled approach advocated in decentralized control [16].
Fourth, we present several illustrative examples. Besides
illustrating our findings concerning centralized and distributed
detection and identification, our numerical investigations show
that our methods are effective also in the presence of system
noise, nonlinearities, and modeling uncertainties.
Finally, as a minor contribution, we build upon the estima-
tion method in [17] to characterize the largest subspace of the
state space of a descriptor system that can be reconstructed in
the presence of unknown inputs.
Paper organization. Section II contains a mathematical de-
scription of the problems under investigation. In Section III we
design monitors for attack detection. Specifically, we propose
optimal centralized, decentralized, and distributed monitors.
In Section IV we show that the attack identification problem
is computationally hard. Additionally, we design an optimal
centralized and a sub-optimal decentralized attack identifi-
cation monitor. Finally, Section V and Section VI contain,
respectively, our numerical studies, and our conclusion.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
In this section we recall the framework proposed in [1] for
cyber-physical systems and attacks. We model a cyber-physical
system under attack with the time-invariant descriptor system
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t),
(1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, y(t) ∈ Rp, E ∈ Rn×n, A ∈ Rn×n,
B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rp×n, and D ∈ Rp×m. Here the matrix E
is possibly singular, and the input terms Bu(t) and Du(t) are
unknown signals describing disturbances affecting the plant.
Besides reflecting the genuine failure of systems components,
these disturbances model the effect of an attack against the
cyber-physical system. For notational convenience and without
affecting generality, we assume that each state and output
variable can be independently compromised by an attacker.
Thus, we let B =
[
I, 0
]
and D =
[
0, I
]
be partitioned into
identity and zero matrices of appropriate dimensions, and,
accordingly, u(t) =
[
ux(t)
T, uy(t)
T
]T
. Hence, the unknown
input (Bu(t), Du(t)) = (ux(t), uy(t)) can be classified as
state attack affecting the system dynamics and as output attack
corrupting directly the measurements vector.
The attack signal t 7→ u(t) ∈ Rn+p depends upon the
specific attack strategy. In the presence of k ∈ N0, k ≤ n+ p,
attackers indexed by the attack set K ⊆ {1, . . . , n + p} only
and all the entries K of u(t) are nonzero over time. To under-
line this sparsity relation, we sometimes use uK(t) ∈ R|K| to
denote the attack mode, that is the subvector of u(t) indexed
by K. Accordingly, we use the pair (BK , DK), where BK and
DK are the submatrices of B and D with columns in K, to
denote the attack signature. Hence, Bu(t) = BKuK(t), and
Du(t) = DKuK(t). We make the following assumptions on
system (1), a discussion of which can be found in [1]:
(A1) the pair (E,A) is regular, that is, det(sE−A) does not
vanish identically,
(A2) the initial condition x(0) ∈ Rn is consistent, that is,
(Ax(0) +Bu(0)) ⊥ Ker(ET) = 0; and
(A3) the input signal u(t) is smooth.
The following definitions are inspired by our results in [1].
Let y(x0, u, t) be the output sequence generated from the
initial state x0 under the attack signal u(t).
Definition 1: (Undetectable attack set) For the linear de-
scriptor system (1), the attack set K is undetectable if there
exist initial conditions x1, x2 ∈ Rn, and an attack mode uK(t)
such that, for all t ∈ R≥0, it holds y(x1, uK , t) = y(x2, 0, t).
Definition 2: (Unidentifiable attack set) For the linear de-
scriptor system (1), the attack set K is unidentifiable if there
exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K, initial
conditions xK , xR ∈ Rn, and attack modes uK(t), uR(t) such
that, for all t ∈ R≥0, it holds y(xK , uK , t) = y(xR, uR, t).
In our companion paper [1] we characterize undetectable
and unidentifiable attacks. In this paper, instead, we design
monitors to achieve attack detection and identification.
III. MONITOR DESIGN FOR ATTACK DETECTION
A. Centralized attack detection monitor design
In the following we present a centralized attack detection
filter based on a modified Luenberger observer.
Theorem 3.1: (Centralized attack detection filter) Consider
the descriptor system (1) and assume that the attack set K is
detectable, and that the network initial state x(0) is known.
Consider the centralized attack detection filter
Ew˙(t) = (A+GC)w(t)−Gy(t),
r(t) = Cw(t)− y(t), (2)
where w(0) = x(0) and the output injection G ∈ Rn×p is
such that the pair (E,A+GC) is regular and Hurwitz. Then
r(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ R≥0 if and only if uK(t) = 0 at all
times t ∈ R≥0. Moreover, in the absence of attacks, the filter
error w(t)− x(t) is exponentially stable.
Proof: Consider the error e(t) = w(t)−x(t) between the
dynamic states of the filter (2) and the descriptor system (1).
The error dynamics with output r(t) are given by
Ee˙(t) = (A+GC)e(t)− (BK +GDK)uK(t),
r(t) = Ce(t)−DKuK(t),
(3)
where e(0) = 0. To prove the theorem we show that the error
system (3) has no invariant zeros, that is, r(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ R≥0 if and only if uK(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0. Since the
initial condition x(0) and the input uK(t) are assumed to be
consistent (A2) and non-impulsive (A3), the error system (3)
has no invariant zeros if and only if [18, Proposition 3.4] there
exists no triple (s, w¯, gK) ∈ C× Rn × Rp satisfying[
sE − (A+GC) BK +GDK
C −DK
] [
w¯
gK
]
=
[
0
0
]
. (4)
The second equation of (4) yields Cw¯ = DKgK . Thus, by
substituting Cw¯ by DKgK in the first equation of (4), the set
of equations (4) can be equivalently written as[
sE −A BK
C −DK
] [
w¯
gK
]
=
[
0
0
]
. (5)
Finally, note that a solution (s,−w¯, gK) to above set of equa-
tions would yield an invariant zero, zero state, and zero input
3for the descriptor system (1). By the detectability assumption,1
the descriptor model (1) has no zero dynamics and the matrix
pencil in (5) necessarily has full rank. It follows that the triple
(E,A,C) is observable, so that G can be chosen to make the
pair (E,A+GC) Hurwitz [19, Theorem 4.1.1], and the error
system (3) is stable and with no zero dynamics.
Remark 1: (Detection and identification filters for un-
known initial condition and noisy dynamics) If the network
initial state is not available, then, since (E,A + GC) is
Hurwitz, an arbitrary initial state w(0) ∈ Rn can be chosen.
Consequently, the filter converges asymptotically, and some
attacks may remain undetected or unidentified. For instance,
if the eigenvalues of the detection filter matrix have real part
smaller than c < 0, with c ∈ R, then, in the absence of attacks,
the residual r(t) exponentially converges to zero with rate less
than c. Hence, only inputs u(t) that vanish faster or equal than
e−ct may remain undetected by the filter (2). Alternatively,
the detection filter can be modified so as to converge in a
predefined finite time, see [20], [21]. In this case, every attack
signal is detectable after a finite transient.
If the dynamics and the measurements of (1) are affected by
modeling uncertainties and noise with known statistics, then
the output injection matrix G in (2) should be chosen as to
optimize the sensitivity of the residual r(t) to attacks versus
the effect of noise. Standard robust filtering or model match-
ing techniques can be adopted for this task [22]. Statistical
hypothesis techniques can subsequently be used to analyze the
residual r(t) [23]. Finally, as discussed in [1], attacks aligned
with the noise statistics turn out to be undetectable. 
Observe that the design of the filter (2) is independent of
the particular attack signature (BK , DK) and its performance
is optimal in the sense that any detectable attack set K can
be detected. We remark that for index-one descriptor systems
such as power system models, the filter (2) can analogously
be designed for the corresponding Kron-reduced model, as
defined in [1]. In this case, the resulting attack detection
filter is low-dimensional and non-singular but also non-sparse,
see [12]. In comparison, the presented filter (2), although
inherently centralized, features the sparse matrices (E,A,C).
This sparsity will be key to develop a distributed attack
detection filter.
B. Decentralized attack detection monitor design
Let Gt = (V, E) be the directed graph associated with
the pair (E,A), where the vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} cor-
responds to the system state, and the set of directed edges
E = {(xj , xi) : eij 6= 0 or aij 6= 0} is induced by the
sparsity pattern of E and A; see also [1, Section IV]. Assume
that V has been partitioned into N disjoint subsets as V =
V1∪· · ·∪VN , with |Vi| = ni, and let Git = (Vi, Ei) be the i-th
subgraph of Gr with vertices Vi and edges Ei = E ∩ (Vi×Vi).
According to this partition, and possibly after relabeling the
1Due to linearity of the descriptor system (1), the detectability assumption
reads as “the attack (B,D, u(t)) is detectable if there exist no initial condition
x0 ∈ Rn, such that y(x0, u, t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0.”
states, the system matrix A in (1) can be written as
A =
 A1 · · · A1N... ... ...
AN1 · · · AN
 = AD +AC ,
where Ai ∈ Rni×ni , Aij ∈ Rni×nj , AD is block-diagonal,
and AC =A−AD. Notice that, if AD = blkdiag(A1, . . . , AN ),
then AD represents the isolated subsystems and AC describes
the interconnection structure among the subsystems. Addition-
ally, if the original system is sparse, then several blocks in AC
vanish. We make the following assumptions:
(A4) the matrices E, C are block-diagonal, that is E =
blkdiag(E1, . . . , EN ), C = blkdiag(C1, . . . , CN ),
where Ei ∈ Rni×ni and Ci ∈ Rpi×ni ,
(A5) each pair (Ei, Ai) is regular, and each triple (Ei, Ai, Ci)
is observable.
Given the above structure and in the absence of attacks, the
descriptor system (1) can be written as the interconnection of
N subsystems of the form
Eix˙i(t) = Aixi(t) +
∑
j∈N ini
Aijxj(t),
yi(t) = Cixi(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(6)
where xi(t) and yi(t) are the state and output of the i-th
subsystem and N ini = {j ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ i : ‖Aij‖ 6= 0}
are the in-neighbors of subsystem i. We also define the set of
out-neighbors as N outi = {j ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ i : ‖Aji‖ 6= 0}.
We assume the presence of a control center in each subnetwork
Git with the following capabilities:
(A6) the i-th control center knows the matrices Ei, Ai, Ci,
as well as the neighboring matrices Aij , j ∈ N ini ; and
(A7) the i-th control center can transmit an estimate of its
state to the j-th control center if j ∈ N outi .
Before deriving a fully-distributed attack detection filter, we
explore the question of decentralized stabilization of the error
dynamics of the filter (2). For each subsystem (6), consider
the local residual generator
Eiw˙i(t) = (Ai +GiCi)wi(t) +
∑
j∈N ini
Aijxj(t)−Giyi(t),
ri(t) = yi(t)− Ciwi(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (7)
where wi(t) is the i-th estimate of xi(t) and Gi ∈ Rni×pi .
In order to derive a compact formulation, let w(t) =
[wT1 (t) · · · wTN (t)]T, r(t) = [rT1 (t) · · · rTN (t)]T, and G =
blkdiag(G1, . . . , GN ). Then, the overall filter dynamics (7) are
Ew˙(t) = (AD +GC)w(t) +ACw(t)−Gy(t) ,
r(t) = y(t)− Cw(t) . (8)
Due to the observability assumption (A5) an output injection
matrix Gi can be chosen such that each pair (Ei, Ai−GiCi)
is Hurwitz [19, Theorem 4.1.1]. Notice that, if each pair
(Ei, Ai+GiCi) is regular and Hurwitz, then (E,AD+GC) is
also regular and Hurwitz since the matrices E and AD +GC
are block-diagonal. We are now ready to state a condition for
the decentralized stabilization of the filter (8).
Lemma 3.2: (Decentralized stabilization of the attack de-
tection filter) Consider the descriptor system (1), and assume
4that the attack set K is detectable and that the network initial
state x(0) is known. Consider the attack detection filter (8),
where w(0) = x(0) and G = blkdiag(G1, . . . , GN ) is such
that (E,AD +GC) is regular and Hurwitz. Assume that
ρ
(
(jωE −AD −GC)−1AC
)
< 1 for all ω ∈ R , (9)
where ρ(·) denotes the spectral radius operator. Then r(t) = 0
at all times t ∈ R≥0 if and only if uK(t) = 0 at all times
t ∈ R≥0. Moreover, in the absence of attacks, the filter error
w(t)− x(t) is exponentially stable.
Proof: The error e(t) = w(t)− x(t) obeys the dynamics
Ee˙(t) = (AD +AC +GC)e(t)− (BK +GDK)uK(t),
r(t) = Ce(t)−DKuK(t) . (10)
A reasoning analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 3.1
shows the absence of zero dynamics. Hence, for r(t) = 0 at all
times t ∈ R≥0 if and only if uK(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ R≥0.
To show stability of the error dynamics in the absence of
attacks, we employ the small-gain approach to large-scale
interconnected systems [24] and rewrite the error dynamics
(10) as the closed-loop interconnection of the two subsystems
Γ1 : Ee˙(t) = (AD +GC)e(t) + v(t) ,
Γ2 : v(t) = ACe(t) .
Since both subsystems Γ1 and Γ2 are causal and internally
Hurwitz stable, the overall error dynamics (10) are stable if the
loop transfer function Γ1(jω) · Γ2 satisfies the spectral radius
condition ρ(Γ1(jω) · Γ2) < 1 for all ω ∈ R [22, Theorem
4.11]. The latter condition is equivalent to (9).
Observe that, although control centers can compute the
output injection matrix independently of each other, an im-
plementation of the decentralized attack detection filter (8)
requires control centers to continuously exchange their local
estimation vectors. Thus, this scheme has high communication
cost, and it may not be broadly applicable. A solution to this
problem is presented in the next section.
C. Distributed attack detection monitor design
In this subsection we exploit the classical waveform relax-
ation method to develop a fully distributed variation of the
decentralized attack detection filter (8). We refer the reader
to [25], [26] for a comprehensive discussion of waveform
relaxation methods. The Gauss-Jacobi waveform relaxation
method applied to the system (8) yields the waveform relax-
ation iteration
Ew˙(k)(t) = ADw
(k)(t) +ACw
(k−1)(t)−Gy(t) , (11)
where k ∈ N denotes the iteration index, t ∈ [0, T ] is the
integration interval for some uniform time horizon T > 0, and
w(k) : [0, T ] → Rn is a trajectory with the initial condition
w(k)(0) = w0 for each k ∈ N. Notice that (11) is a descriptor
system in the variable w(k) and the vector ACw(k−1) is a
known input, since the value of w(t) at iteration k−1 is used.
The iteration (11) is said to be (uniformly) convergent if
lim
k→∞
max
t∈[0,T ]
∥∥w(k)(t)− w(t)∥∥∞ = 0 ,
where w(t) is the solution of the non-iterative dynamics (8). In
order to obtain a low-complexity distributed detection scheme,
we use the waveform relaxation iteration (11) to iteratively
approximate the decentralized filter (8).
We start by presenting a convergence condition for the
iteration (8). Recall that a function f : R≥0 → Rp is said to
be of exponential order β if there exists β ∈ R such that the
exponentially scaled function f˜ : R≥0 → Rp, f(t) = f(t)e−βt
and all its derivatives exist and are bounded. An elegant
analysis of the waveform relaxation iteration (11) can be
carried out in the Laplace domain [27], where the operator
mapping w(k−1)(t) to w(k)(t) is (sE − AD − GC)−1AC .
Similar to the regular Gauss-Jacobi iteration, convergence
conditions of the waveform relaxation iteration (11) rely on
the contractivity of the iteration operator.
Lemma 3.3: (Convergence of the waveform relaxation [27,
Theorem 5.2]) Consider the waveform relaxation iteration
(11). Let the pair (E,AD + GC) be regular, and the initial
condition w0 be consistent. Let y(t), with t ∈ [0, T ], be of
exponential order β. Let α be the least upper bound on the real
part of the spectrum of (E,A), and define σ = max{α, β}.
The waveform relaxation method (11) is convergent if
ρ
(
((σ + jω)E −AD −GC)−1AC
)
< 1 for all ω ∈R. (12)
In the reasonable case of bounded (integrable) measure-
ments y(t), t ∈ [0, T ], and stable filter dynamics, we have
that σ ≤ 0, and the convergence condition (12) for the
waveform relaxation iteration (11) equals the condition (9)
for decentralized stabilization of the filer dynamics. We now
propose our distributed attack detection filter.
Theorem 3.4: (Distributed attack detection filter) Consider
the descriptor system (1) and assume that the attack set K is
detectable, and that the network initial state x(0) is known.
Let assumptions (A1) through (A7) be satisfied and consider
the distributed attack detection filter
Ew˙(k)(t) =
(
AD +GC
)
w(k)(t) +ACw
(k−1)(t)−Gy(t) ,
r(t) = y(t)− Cw(k)(t) , (13)
where k ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ] for some T > 0, w(k)(0) = x(0) for
all k ∈ N, and G = blkdiag(G1, . . . , GN ) is such that the pair
(E,AD +GC) is regular, Hurwitz, and
ρ
(
(jωE −AD −GC)−1AC
)
< 1 for all ω ∈ R . (14)
Then limk→∞ r(k)(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ [0, T ] if and only
if uK(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, in the absence
of attacks, the asymptotic filter error limk→∞(w(k)(t)−x(t))
is exponentially stable for t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: Since w(k)(0) = x(0), it follows from Lemma 3.3
that the solution w(k)(t) of the iteration (13) converges, as k →
∞, to the solution w(t) of the non-iterative filter dynamics (8)
if condition (12) is satisfied with σ = 0 (due to integrability of
y(t), t ∈ [0, T ], and since the pair (E,AD+GC) is Hurwitz).
The latter condition is equivalent to condition (14).
Under condition (14) and due to the Hurwitz assumption,
it follows from Lemma 3.2 that the error e(t) = w(t) − x(t)
between the state w(t) of the decentralized filter dynamics (8)
and the state x(t) of the descriptor model (1) is asymptotically
stable in the absence of attacks. Due to the detectability as-
sumption and by reasoning analogous to the proof of Theorem
53.1, it follows that the error dynamics e(t) have no invariant
zeros. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Remark 2: (Distributed attack detection) The waveform
relaxation iteration (11) can be implemented in the following
distributed fashion. Assume that each control center i is able
to numerically integrate the descriptor system
Eiw˙
(k)
i (t) =(Ai +GiCi)w
(k)
i (t)
+
∑
j∈N ini
Aijw
(k−1)
j (t)−Giyi(t) , (15)
over a time interval t ∈ [0, T ], with initial condition w(k)i (0) =
wi,0, measurements yi(t), and the neighboring filter states
w
(k−1)
j (t) as external inputs. Let w
(0)
j (t) be an initial guess of
the signal wj(t). Each control center i ∈ {1, . . . , N} performs
the following operations assuming k = 0 at start:
(1) set k := k + 1, and compute the signal w(k)i (t) by
integrating the local filter equation (15),
(2) transmit w(k)i (t) to the j-th control center if j ∈ N outi
(3) update the input w(k)j with the signal received from the
j-th control center, with j ∈ N ini , and iterate.
If the waveform relaxation is convergent, then, for k suffi-
ciently large, the residuals r(k)i (t) = yi(t) − Ciw(k)i (t) can
be used to detect attacks; see Theorem 3.4. In summary,
our distributed attack detection scheme requires integration
capabilities at each control center, knowledge of the measure-
ments yi(t), t ∈ [0, T ], as well as synchronous discrete-time
communication between neighboring control centers. 
Remark 3: (Distributed filter design) As discussed in Re-
mark 2, the filter (13) can be implemented in a distributed
fashion. In fact, it is also possible to design the filter (13),
that is, the output injections Gi, in an entirely distributed way.
Since ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖p for any matrix A and any induced p-norm,
condition (14) can be relaxed by the small gain criterion to∥∥(jωE −AD −GC)−1AC∥∥p < 1 for all ω ∈ R . (16)
With p =∞, in order to satisfy condition (16), it is sufficient
for each control center i to verify the following quasi-block
diagonal dominance condition [28] for each ω ∈ R:∥∥∥(jωEi −Ai −GiCi)−1∑n
j=1,j 6=iAij
∥∥∥
∞
< 1. (17)
Note that condition (17) can be checked with local informa-
tion, and it is a conservative relaxation of condition (14). 
D. Illustrative example of decentralized detection
The IEEE 118 bus system shown in Fig. 1 represents a
portion of the Midwestern American Electric Power System
as of December 1962. This test case system is composed of
118 buses and 54 generators, and its parameters can be found,
for example, in [29]. Following [1, Section II.C], a linear
continuous-time descriptor model of the network dynamics
under attack assumes the form (1).
For estimation and attack detection purposes, we partition
the IEEE 118 bus system into 5 disjoint areas, we assign a
control center to each area, and we implement our detection
procedure via the filter (13); see Fig. 1 for a graphical
illustration. Suppose that each control center continuously
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Fig. 1. Partition of IEEE 118 bus system into 5 areas. Each area is monitored
and operated by a control center. The control centers cooperate to estimate
the state and to assess the functionality of the whole network.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40ï1
0
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40ï1
0
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40ï1
0
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40ï1
0
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40ï1
0
1
Time
Residual area 1
Residual area 2
Residual area 4
Residual area 5
Residual area 3
Fig. 2. In this figure we show the residual functions computed through
the distributed attack detection filter (13). The attacker compromises the
measurements of all the generators in area 1 from time 30 with a signal
uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 0.5]. The attack is correctly detected,
because the residual functions do not decay to zero. For the simulation, we
run k = 100 iterations of the attack detection method.
measures the angle of the generators in its area, and suppose
that an attacker compromises the measurements of all the
generators of the first area. In particular, starting at time 30s,
the attacker adds a signal uK(t) to all measurements in area
1. It can be verified that the attack set K is detectable, see [1].
According to assumption (A3), the attack signal uK(t) needs
to be continuous to guarantee a continuous state trajectory
(since the power network is a descriptor system of index 1).
In order to show the robustness of our detection filter (13), we
let uK(t) be randomly distributed in the interval [0, 0.5] rad.
The control centers implement the distributed attack de-
tection procedure described in (13), with G = ACT. It can
be verified that the pair (E,AD + GC) is Hurwitz stable,
and that ρ
(
jωE −AD −GC)−1AC
)
< 1 for all ω ∈ R.
As predicted by Theorem 3.4, our distributed attack detection
filter is convergent; see Fig. 2. For completeness, in Fig. 3 we
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Fig. 3. The plot represents the error of our waveform relaxation based filter
(13) with respect to the corresponding decentralized filter (8). Here the error
is maxt∈[0,T ]
∥∥w(k)(t)− w(t)∥∥∞, that is, the worst-case difference of the
outputs of the two filters. As predicted by Theorem 3.4, the error is convergent.
illustrate the convergence of our waveform relaxation-based
filter as a function of the number of iterations k. Notice that
the number of iterations directly reflects the communication
complexity of our detection scheme.
IV. MONITOR DESIGN FOR ATTACK IDENTIFICATION
A. Complexity of the attack identification problem
In this section we study the problem of attack identification,
that is, the problem of identifying from measurements the
state and output variables corrupted by the attacker. We start
our discussion by showing that this problem is generally NP-
hard. For a vector x ∈ Rn, let supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
xi 6= 0}, let ‖x‖`0 = |supp(x)| denote the number of non-
zero entries, and for a vector-valued signal v : R≥0 → Rn,
let ‖v‖L0 = | ∪t∈R≥0 supp(v(t))|. We consider the following
cardinality minimization problem: given a descriptor system
with dynamic matrices E,A ∈ Rn×n, measurement matrix
C ∈ Rp×n, and measurement signal y : R≥0 → Rp, find
the minimum cardinality input signals vx : R≥0 → Rn and
vy : R≥0 → Rp and an arbitrary initial condition ξ0 ∈ Rn
that explain the data y(t), that is,
min
vx, vy, ξ0
‖vx‖L0 + ‖vy‖L0
subject to Eξ˙(t) = Aξ(t) + vx(t),
y(t) = Cξ(t) + vy(t),
ξ(0) = ξ0 ∈ Rn .
(18)
Lemma 4.1: (Problem equivalence) Consider the system
(1) with identifiable attack set K. The optimization problem
(18) coincides with the problem of identifying the attack set K
given the system matrices E, A, C, and the measurements y(t),
where K = supp([vTx v
T
y ]).
Proof: Due to the identifiability of K, the attack identification
problem consists of finding the smallest attack set capable of
injecting an attack (BKuK , DKuK) that generates the given
measurements y for the given dynamics E, A, C, and some
initial condition; see Definition 2. The statement follows since
B = [I, 0] and D = [0, I] in (1), so that (BKuK , DKuK) =
(vx, vy).
As it turns out, the optimization problem (18), or equiva-
lently our identification problem, is generally NP-hard [30].
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Fig. 4. A regular consensus system (A,B,C), where the state variable 3
is corrupted by the attacker, and the state variables 2, 4, and 7 are directly
measured. Due to the sparsity pattern of (A,B,C) any attack of cardinality
one is generically detectable and identifiable, see [1], [7] for further details.
Corollary 4.2: (Complexity of the attack identification
problem) Consider the system (1) with identifiable attack set
K. The attack identification problem given the system matrices
E, A, C, and the measurements y(t) is NP-hard.
Proof: Consider the NP-hard [31] sparse recovery problem
minξ¯∈Rn ‖y¯− C¯ξ¯‖`0 , where C¯ ∈ Rp×n and y¯ ∈ Rp are given
and constant. In order to prove the claimed statement, we show
that every instance of the sparse recovery problem can be cast
as an instance of (18). Let E = I , A = 0, C = C¯, and
y(t) = y¯ at all times. Notice that vy(t) = y¯ − Cξ(t) and
ξ(t) = ξ(0)+
∫ t
0
vx(τ)dτ . The problem (18) can be written as
min
vx, ξ
‖vx‖L0 + ‖y¯ − C¯ξ(t)‖L0
= min
vx(t), ξ¯
‖vx(t)‖L0 + ‖y¯ − C¯ξ¯ − C¯
∫ t
0
vx(τ)dτ‖L0 ,
(19)
where ξ¯ = ξ(0). Notice that there exists a minimizer to
problem (19) with vx(t) = 0 for all t. Indeed, since ‖y¯−C¯ξ¯−
C¯
∫ t
0
vx(τ)dτ‖L0 = |∪t∈R≥0 supp(y¯− C¯ξ¯− C¯
∫ t
0
vx(τ)dτ)| ≥
|supp(y¯ − C¯ξ¯ − C¯ ∫ 0
0
vx(τ)dτ)| = ‖y¯ − C¯ξ¯‖`0 , problem (19)
can be equivalently written as minξ¯ ‖y¯ − C¯ξ¯‖`0 .
By Corollary 4.2 the general attack identification problem
is combinatorial in nature, and its general solution will re-
quire substantial computational effort. In the next sections we
propose an optimal algorithm with high computational com-
plexity, and a sub-optimal algorithm with low computational
complexity. We conclude this section with an example.
Example 1: (Attack identification via `1 regularization) A
classical procedure to handle cardinality minimization prob-
lems of the form minv∈Rn ‖y − Av‖`0 is to use the `1
regularization minv∈Rn ‖y − Av‖`1 [31]. This procedure can
be adapted to the optimization problem (18) after converting it
into an algebraic optimization problem, for instance by taking
subsequent derivatives of the output y(t), or by discretizing
the continuous-time system (1) and recording several mea-
surements. As shown in [8], for discrete-time systems the
`1 regularization performs reasonably well in the presence of
output attacks. However, in the presence of state attacks such
an `1 relaxation performs generally poorly. In what follows,
we develop an intuition when and why this approach fails.
Consider a consensus system with underlying network graph
(sparsity pattern of A) illustrated in Fig. 4. The dynamics
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Fig. 5. Plot of the attack mode u¯(t) for the attack set K¯ = {2, 4, 7} to
generate the same output as the attack set K = {3} with attack mode u(t) =
1. Although |K¯| > |K|, we have that |u¯i(t)| < |u(t)|/3 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
are described by the nonsingular matrix E = I and the state
matrix A depending on the small parameter 0 < ε 1 as
A =

−0.8 0.1 0 0.2 0.5 0 0 0
0.1 −0.4−ε ε 0 0 0.3 0 0
0 3ε −9ε 0 0 0 6ε 0
0.1 0 ε −0.5−ε 0 0 0 0.4
0.1 0 0 0 −0.6 0.2 0 0.3
0 0.4 0 0 0.1 −0.6 0.1 0
0 0 3ε 0 0 0.4 −0.6−3ε 0.2
0 0 0 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 −0.7
 .
The measurement matrix C and the attack signature BK are
C =
[
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
]
, BTK = [ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ] ,
and we let G(s) = C(sI − A)−1BK . It can be verified that
the state attack K = {3} is detectable and identifiable.
Consider also the state attack K¯ = {2, 4, 7} with signature
BTK¯ =
[
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
]
,
and let G¯(s) = C(sI − A)−1BK¯ . We now adopt the short-
hands u(t) = uK(t) and u¯(t) = uK¯(t), and denote their
Laplace transforms by U(s) and U¯(s), respectively. Notice
that G¯(s) is right-invertible [32]. Thus, Y (s) = G(s)U(s) =
G¯(s)
(
G¯−1(s)G(s)U(s)
)
. In other words, the measurements
Y (s) generated by the attack signal U(s) can equivalently be
generated by the signal U¯(s) = G¯−1(s)G(s)U(s). Obviously,
we have that ‖u¯‖L0 = 3 > ‖u‖L0 = 1, that is, the attack set K
achieves a lower cost than K¯ in the optimization problem (18).
Consider now the numerical realization ε = 0.0001, x(0) =
0, and u(t) = 1 for all t ∈ R≥0. The corresponding attack
mode u¯(t) is shown in Fig. 5. Since |u¯i(t)| < 1/3 for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and t ∈ R≥0, it follows that ‖u(t)‖`p>‖u¯(t)‖`p
point-wise in time and ‖u(t)‖Lq/`p > ‖u¯(t)‖Lp/`q , where
p, q ≥ 1 and ‖u(t)‖Lq/`p =
(∫∞
0
(
∑n+p
i=1 |ui(τ)|p)q/pdτ
)1/q
is
the Lq/`p-norm. Hence, the attack set K¯ achieves a lower cost
than K for any algebraic version of the optimization problem
(18) penalizing a `p cost point-wise in time or a Lq/`p cost
over a time interval. Since ‖u¯‖L0>‖u‖L0 , we conclude that,
in general, the identification problem cannot be solved by a
point-wise `p or Lq/`p regularization for any p, q ≥ 1.
Notice that, for any choice of network parameters, a value
of ε can be found such that a point-wise `p or a Lq/`p
regularization procedure fails at identifying the attack set.
Moreover, large-scale stable systems often exhibit this behav-
ior independently of the system parameters. This can be easily
seen in discrete-time systems, where a state attack with attack
set K affects the output via the matrix CAr−1BK , where r
is the relative degree of (A,BK , C). Hence, if A is Schur
stable and thus limk→∞Ak = 0, then CAr−1BK converges
to the zero matrix for increasing relative degree. In this case,
an attack closer to the sensors may achieve a lower Lq/`p cost
than an attack far from sensors independently of the cardinality
of the attack set. In short, the -connections in Fig. 4 can be
thought of as the effect of a large relative degree in a stable
system. 
B. Centralized attack identification monitor design
As previously shown, unlike the detection case, the identifi-
cation of the attack set K requires a combinatorial procedure,
since, a priori, K is one of the
(
n+p
|K|
)
possible attack sets. The
following centralized attack identification procedure consists
of designing a residual filter to determine whether a predefined
set coincides with the attack set. The design of this residual fil-
ter consists of three steps – an input output transformation (see
Lemma 4.3), a state transformation to a suitable conditioned-
invariant subspace (see Lemma 4.4), and an output injection
and definition of a proper residual (see Theorem 4.5).
As a first design step, we show that the identification prob-
lem can be carried out for a modified system without corrupted
measurements, that is, without the feedthrough matrix D.
Lemma 4.3: (Attack identification with safe measure-
ments) Consider the descriptor system (1) with attack set K.
The attack set K is identifiable for the descriptor system (1) if
and only if it is identifiable for the following descriptor system:
Ex˙(t) = (A−BKD†KC)x(t) +BK(I −D†KDK)uK(t),
y˜(t) = (I −DKD†K)Cx(t). (20)
Proof: Due to the identifiability hypothesis, there exists
no attack set R with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K, s ∈ C, gK ∈
R|K|, gR ∈ R|R|, and x ∈ Rn \ {0} such that sE −A −BK −BRC DK DR
C DK DR
 xgK
gR
 =
00
0
 , (21)
where we added an additional (redundant) output equation [1,
Theorem 3.4]. A multiplication of equation (21) from the left
by the projectors blkdiag
(
I , DKD
†
K , (I −DKD†K)
)
yields sE −A −BK −BRDKD†KC DK DKD†KDR
(I −DKD†K)C 0 (I −DKD†K)DR
 xgK
gR
=
00
0
 .
The variable gK can be eliminated in the first redundant
(corrupted) output equation according to
gK = −D†KCx−D†KDRgR + (I −D†KDK)gK .
Thus, P (s)[xT gTK g
T
R]
T = 0 has no solution, where P (s) is[
sE −A + BKD†KC −BK(I −D†KDK) −BR + BKD†KDR
(I −DKD†K)C 0 (I −DKD†K)DR
]
The statement follows.
8The second design step of our attack identification monitor
relies on the concept of conditioned invariant subspace. We
refer to [18], [32], [33] for a comprehensive discussion of
conditioned invariant subspaces. Let S∗ be the conditioned
invariant subspace associated with the system (E,A,B,C,D),
that is, the smallest subspace of the state space satisfying
S∗ = [A B]([E−1S∗Rm
]
∩Ker [C D]) , (22)
and let L be an output injection matrix satisfying[
A+ LC B + LD
] [E−1S∗
Rm
]
⊆ S∗. (23)
We transform the descriptor system (20) into a set of canonical
coordinates representing S∗ and its orthogonal complement.
For a nonsingular system (E = I) such an equivalent state
representation can be achieved by a nonsingular transformation
of the form Q−1(sI − A)Q. However, for a singular system
different transformations need to be applied in the domain and
codomain such as PT(sE −A)Q for nonsingular P and Q.
Lemma 4.4: (Input decoupled system representation)
For the system (20), let S∗ and L be as in
(22) and (23), respectively. Define the unitary
matrices P =
[
Basis(S∗) Basis((S∗)⊥)] and
Q =
[
Basis(E−1S∗) Basis((E−1S∗)⊥)]. Then
PTEQ=
[
E˜11 E˜12
0 E˜22
]
, PT(A−BKD†KC + LC)Q=
[
A˜11 A˜12
0 A˜22
]
,
PTBK(I −D†KDK)=
[
B˜K(t)
0
]
, (I −DKD†K)C)Q=
[
C˜1 C˜2
]
.
The attack set K is identifiable for the descriptor system (1)
if and only if it is identifiable for the descriptor system[
E˜11 E˜12
0 E˜22
] [
x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
]
=
[
A˜11 A˜12
0 A˜22
] [
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
+
[
B˜K(t)
0
]
,
y(t) =
[
C˜1 C˜2
] [x1(t)
x2(t)
]
. (24)
Proof: Let L = E−1S∗ and M = S∗. Notice that (A+
LC)E−1S∗ ⊆ S∗ by the invariance property of S∗ [33], [18].
It follows that L andM are a pair of right deflating subspaces
for the matrix pair (A+LC,E) [34], that is, M = AL+EL
and dim(M) ≤ dim(L). The sparsity pattern in the descriptor
and dynamic matrices E˜ and A˜ of (24) arises by construction
of the right deflating subspaces P and Q [34, Eq. (2.17)],
and the sparsity pattern in the input matrix arises due to the
invariance properties of S∗ containing Im(BK). The statement
follows because the output injection L, the coordinate change
x 7→ Q−1x, and the left-multiplication of the dynamics by PT
does not affect the existence of zero dynamics.
We call system (24) the conditioned system associated with
(1). For the ease of notation and without affecting generality,
the third and final design step of our attack identification filter
is presented for the conditioned system (24).
Theorem 4.5: (Attack identification filter for attack set
K) Consider the conditioned system (24) associated with the
descriptor system (1). Assume that the attack set is identifiable,
the network initial state x(0) is known, and the assumptions
(A1) through (A3) are satisfied. Consider the attack identifi-
cation filter for the attack signature (BK , DK)
E˜22w˙2(t) = (A˜22 + G˜(I − C˜1C˜†1)C˜2)w2(t)− G˜y¯(t),
rK(t) = (I − C˜1C˜†1)C˜2w2(t)− y¯(t), with
y¯(t) = (I − C˜1C˜†1)C˜2y(t),
(25)
where w2(0) = x2(0), and G˜ is such that (E˜22, A˜22 + G˜(I −
C˜1C˜
†
1)C˜2) is Hurwitz. Then rK(t) = 0 for all times t ∈ R≥0
if and only if K coincides with the attack set.
Proof: Let w(t) = [w1(t)T w2(t)T]T, where w1(t) obeys
E˜11w˙1(t) + E˜12w˙2(t) = A˜11w1(t) + A˜12w2(t).
Consider the filter error e(t) = w(t)− x(t), and notice that[
E˜11 E˜12
0 E22
] [
e˙1(t)
e˙2(t)
]
=
[
A˜11 A˜12
0 A¯22
] [
e1(t)
e2(t)
]
−
[
B˜K
0
]
uK(t),
rK(t) = (I − C˜1C˜†1)C˜2e2(t),
where A¯22 = A˜22 + G˜(I − C˜1C˜†1)C˜2). Notice that rK(t) is
not affected by the input uK(t), so that, since e2(0) = 0 due
to w2(0) = x2(0), the residual rK(t) is identically zero when
K is the attack set. In order to prove the theorem we are left
to show that for every set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R∩K = ∅,
every attack mode uR(t) results in a nonzero residual rK(t).
From [1, Theorem 3.4] and the identifiability hypothesis, for
any R 6= K, there exists no solution to sE˜11 − A˜11 sE˜12 − A˜12 B˜K −BR10 sE˜22 − A¯22 0 −BR2
C˜1 C˜2 0 DR


x1
x2
gK
gR
=

0
0
0
0
.
A projection of the equation 0 = C˜1x1 + C˜2x2 +DRgR onto
the image of C˜1 and its orthogonal complement yields sE˜11 − A˜11 sE˜12 − A˜12 BK −BR10 sE˜22 − A¯22 0 −BR2
C˜1 C˜1C˜
†
1C˜2 0 C˜1C˜
†
1DR
0 (I − C˜1C˜†1)C˜2 0 (I − C˜1C˜†1)DR

x1x2
gK
gR

= [0 0 0 0]
T
. (26)
Due to the identifiability hypothesis the set of equations (26)
features no solution [xT1 x
T
2 g
T
K g
T
R]
T with [xT1 x
T
2 ]
T = 0.
Observe that, for every x2 and gR, there exists x1 ∈
Ker(C˜1)
⊥ such that the third equation of (26) is satisfied. Fur-
thermore, for every x2 and gR, there exist x1 ∈ Ker(C˜1) and
gK such that the first equation of (26) is satisfied. Indeed, since
QE−1S∗ = [Im(I) 0]T and PTS∗ = [Im(I) 0]T, the invari-
ance of S∗ implies that S∗ = A(E−1S∗∩Ker(C))+Im(BK),
or equivalently in new coordinates, Im(I) = A˜11 Ker(C˜1) +
Im(B˜K). Finally note that [(sE˜11 − A˜11) Ker(C˜1) B˜K ] is of
full row rank due to the controllability of the subspace S∗
[18]. We conclude that there exist no vectors x2 and gR such
that (sE˜22 − A¯22)x2 −BR2gR = 0 and (I − C˜1C˜†1)(C˜2x2 +
DRgR) = 0 and the statement follows.
Our identification procedure is summarized in Algorithm
1. Observe that the proposed attack identification filter ex-
tends classical results concerning the design of unknown-
input fault detection filters. In particular, our filter generalizes
the construction of [15] to descriptor systems with direct
9Algorithm 1: Identification Monitor for (BK , DK)
Input : Matrices E, A, BK , and DK ,;
Require : Identifiability of attack set K;
1 From system (1) define the system (20);
2 Compute S∗ and L for system (20) as in (22) and (23);
3 Apply L, P , and Q as in Lemma 4.4 leading to system (24);
4 For (24), define rK and apply the output injection G¯ as in (25).
feedthrough matrix. Additionally, we guarantee the absence
of invariant zeros in the residual dynamics. By doing so, our
attack identification filter is sensitive to every attack mode.
Notice that classical fault detection filters, for instance those
presented in [15], are guaranteed to detect and isolate signals
that do not excite exclusively zero dynamics. Finally, an attack
identification filter for the case of state space or index-one
systems is presented in our previous work [12].
Remark 4: (Complexity of centralized identification) Our
centralized identification procedure assumes the knowledge of
the cardinality k of the attack set, and it achieves identification
of the attack set by constructing a residual generator for(
n+p
k
)
possible attack sets. Thus, for each finite value of
k, our procedure constructs O(nk) filters. If only an upper
bound k¯ on the cardinality of the attack set is available,
identification can be achieved by constructing
(n+p
k¯
)
filters,
and by intersecting the attack sets generating zero residuals.
Remark 5: (Attack identification filter in the presence
of noise) Let the dynamics and the measurements of the
system (1) be affected, respectively, by the additive white noise
signals η(t), with E[η(t)ηT(τ)] = Rηδ(t− τ), and ζ(t), with
E[ζ(t)ζT(τ)] = Rζδ(t − τ). Let the state and output noise
be independent of each other. Then, simple calculations show
that the dynamics and the output of the attack identification
filter (25) are affected, respectively, by the noise signals
ηˆ(t) = PTη(t) + PT(L(I −DKD†K)−BKD†K)ζ(t),
ζˆ(t) = −
(
I −
[
(I −DKD†K)CQ1
] [
(I −DKD†K)CQ1
]†
(I −DKD†K)
)
ζ(t),
where Q1 = Basis(E−1S∗). Define the covariance matrix
Rηˆ,ζˆ = E
([
ηˆ(t)
ζˆ(t)
] [
ηˆT(t) ζˆT(t)
])
.
Notice that the off-diagonal elements of Rηˆ,ζˆ are in general
nonzero, that is, the state and output noises of the attack
identification filter are not independent of each other. As in
the detection case, by using the covariance matrix Rηˆ,ζˆ , the
output injection matrix G˜ in (25) can be designed to optimize
the robustness of the residual rK(t) against noise. A related
example is in Section V. 
We conclude this section by observing that a distributed
implementation of our attack identification scheme is not
practical. Indeed, even if the filters parameters may be obtained
via distributed computation, still
(
n+p
k
)
filters would need
to be implemented to identify an attack of cardinality k.
Such a distributed implementation results in an enormous
communication effort and does not reduce the fundamental
combinatorial complexity.
C. Fully decoupled attack identification
In the following sections we develop a distributed attack
identification procedure. Consider the decentralized setup pre-
sented in Section III-B with assumptions (A4)-(A7). The
subsystem assigned to the i-th control center is
Eix˙i(t) = Aixi(t) +
∑
j∈N ini
Aijxj(t) +BKiuKi(t),
yi(t) = Cixi(t) +DKiuKi(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(27)
where Ki = (K ∩ Vi) ∪Kpi with K being the attack set and
Kpi being the set of corrupted measurements in the region G
i
t .
As a first distributed identification method we consider the
fully decoupled case (no cooperation among control centers).
In the spirit of [16], the neighboring states xj(t) affecting xi(t)
are treated as unknown inputs (fi(t)) to the i-th subsystem:
Eix˙i(t) = Aixi(t) +B
b
i fi(t) +BKiuKi(t),
yi(t) = Cixi(t) +DKiuKi(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(28)
where Bbi = [Ai1 · · · Ai,i−1Ai,i+1 · · · AiN ]. We refer to (28)
as to the i-th decoupled system, and we let Kbi ⊆ Vi be the
set of boundary nodes of (28), that is, the nodes j ∈ Vi with
Ajk 6= 0 for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ Vi.
If the attack identification procedure in Section IV-B is de-
signed for the i-th decoupled system (28) subject to unknown
inputs fi(t) and uKi(t), then a total of only
∑N
i=1
(
ni+pi
|Ki|
)
<(
n+p
|K|
)
need to be designed. Although the combinatorial com-
plexity of the identification problem is tremendously reduced,
this decoupled identification procedure has several limitations.
The following fundamental limitations follow from [1]:
(L1) if (Ei, Ai, BKi , Ci, DKi) has invariant zeros, then Ki is
not detectable by the i-th control center;
(L2) if there is an attack set Ri, with |Ri| ≤ |Ki|, such that
(Ei, Ai, [BKi BRi ], Ci, [DKi DRi ]) has invariant zeros,
then Ki is not identifiable by the i-th control center;
(L3) if Ki 6⊆ Kbi and (Ei, Ai, [Bbi BKi ], Ci, DKi) has no
invariant zeros, then Ki is detectable by the i-th control
center; and
(L4) if Ki 6⊆ Kbi and there is no attack set Ri, with |Ri| ≤
|Ki|, such that (Ei, Ai, [Bbi BKi BRi ], Ci, [DKi DRi ])
has invariant zeros, then Ki is identifiable by the i-th
control center.
Whereas limitations (L1) and (L2) also apply to any central-
ized attack detection and identification monitor, limitations
(L3) and (L4) arise by naively treating the neighboring signals
as unknown inputs. Since, in general, the i-th control center
cannot distinguish between an unknown input from a safe
subsystem, an unknown input from a corrupted subsystem,
and a boundary attack with the same input direction, we can
further state that
(L5) any (boundary) attack set Ki ⊆ Kbi is not detectable
and not identifiable by the i-th control center, and
(L6) any (external) attack set K \ Ki is not detectable and
not identifiable by the i-th control center.
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We remark that, following our graph-theoretic analysis in [1,
Section IV], the attack Ki is generically identifiable by the i-th
control center if the number of attacks |Ki| on the i-th subsys-
tem is sufficiently small, the internal connectivity of the i-th
subsystem (size of linking between unknown inputs/attacks
and outputs) is sufficiently high, and the number of unknown
signals |Kbi | from neighboring subsystems is sufficiently small.
These criteria can ultimately be used to select an attack-
resilient partitioning of a cyber-physical system.
D. Cooperative attack identification
In this section we improve upon the naive fully decoupled
method presented in Subsection IV-C and propose an identi-
fication method based upon a divide and conquer procedure
with cooperation. This method consists of the following steps.
(S1: estimation and communication) Each control center
estimates the state of its own region by means of an unknown-
input observer for the i-th subsystem subject to the unknown
input Bbi fi(t). For this task we build upon existing unknown-
input estimation algorithms (see the Appendix for a construc-
tive procedure). Assume that the state xi(t) is reconstructed
modulo some subspace Fi.2 Let Fi = Basis(Fi), and let
xi(t) = x˜i(t) + xˆi(t), where xˆi(t) is the estimate computed
by the i-th control center, and x˜i(t) ∈ Fi. Assume that each
control center i transmits the estimate xˆi(t) and the uncertainty
subspace Fi to every neighboring control center.
(S2: residual generation) Observe that each input sig-
nal Aijxj(t) can be written as Aijxj(t) = Aij x˜j(t) +
Aij xˆj(t), where x˜j(t) ∈ Fj . Then, after carrying out
step (S1), only the inputs Aij x˜j(t) are unknown to the
i-th control center, while the inputs Aij xˆj(t) are known
to the i-th center due to communication. Let BbiFi =
[Ai1F1 · · · Ai,i−1Fi−1Ai,i+1Fi+1 · · · AiNFN ], and rewrite
the signal Bbi x˜(t) as B
b
i x˜(t) = B
b
iFifi(t), for some unknown
signal fi(t). Then the dynamics of the i-th subsystem read as
Eix˙i(t) = Aixi(t) +B
b
i xˆ(t) +B
b
iFifi(t) +BKiuKi(t).
Analogously to the filter presented in Theorem 4.5 for the at-
tack signature (BK , DK), consider now the following filter (in
appropriate coordinates) for (28) for the signature (BbiFi, 0)
Eiw˙i(t) = (Ai + LiCi)wi(t)− Ly(t) +Bbi x¯(t),
ri(t) = Mwi(t)−Hy(t),
(29)
where Li is the injection matrix associated with the condi-
tioned invariant subspace generated by BbiFi, with (Ei, Ai +
LiCi) Hurwitz, and x¯(t) is the state transmitted to i by its
neighbors. Notice that, in the absence of attacks in the regions
N ini , we have Bbi x¯(t) = Bbi xˆ(t). Finally, let the matrices
M and H in (29) be chosen so that the input BbiFifi(t)
does not affect the residual ri(t).3 Consider the filter error
ei(t) = wi(t)− xi(t), and notice that
Eie˙i(t) = (Ai + LiCi)ei(t) +B
b
i (x¯(t)− xˆ(t))−BKiuKi(t)
−BbiFifi(t), (30)
ri(t) = Mei(t),
2For nonsingular systems without feedthrough matrix, Fi is as small as the
largest (Ai, Bbi )-controlled invariant subspace contained in Ker(Ci) [32].
3See Section IV-B for a detailed construction of this type of filter.
(S3: cooperative residual analysis) We next state a key result
for our distributed identification procedure.
Lemma 4.6: (Characterization of nonzero residuals) Let
each control center implement the distributed identification
filter (29) with wi(0) = xi(0). Assume that the attack K
affects only the i-th subsystem, that is K = Ki. Assume
that (Ei, Ai, [BbiFiBKi ], Ci) and (Ei, Ai, B
b
i , Ci) have no
invariant zeros. Then,
(i) ri(t) 6= 0 at some time t, and
(ii) either rj(t) = 0 for all j ∈ N outi at all times t, or
rj(t) 6= 0 for all j ∈ N outi at some time t.
Proof: Notice that the estimation computed by a control
center is correct provided that its area is not under attack. In
other words, since K = Ki, we have that Bbi xˆ(t) = B
b
i x¯(t)
in (30). Since (Ei, Ai, [BbiFiBKi ], Ci) has no invariant zeros,
statement (i) follows. In order to prove statement (ii), consider
the following two cases: the i-th control center provides the
correct estimation xˆi(t) = x¯i(t) or an incorrect estimation
xˆi(t) 6= x¯i(t). For instance, if Im(BKi) ⊆ Im(Bbi ), that is,
the attack set Ki lies on the boundary of the i-th area, then
xˆi(t) = x¯i(t). Notice that, if xˆi(t) = x¯i(t), then each residual
rj(t), j 6= i, is identically zero since the associated residual
dynamics (30) evolve as an autonomous system without inputs.
Suppose now that xˆi(t) 6= x¯i(t). Notice that BbiFifi(t) +
Bbi (xˆ(t) − x¯(t)) ∈ Im(Bbi ). Then, since (Ei, Ai, Bbi , Ci) has
no invariant zeros, each residual rj(t) is nonzero for some t.
As a consequence of Lemma 4.6 the region under attack can
be identified through a distributed procedure. Indeed, the i-th
area is safe if either of the following two criteria is satisfied:
(C1) the associated residual ri(t) is identically zero, or
(C2) the neighboring areas j ∈ N outi feature both zero and
nonzero residuals rj(t).
Consider now the case of several simultaneously corrupted
subsystems. Then, if the graphical distance between any two
corrupted areas is at least 2, that is, if there are at least two
uncorrupted areas between any two corrupted areas, corrupted
areas can be identified via our distributed method and criteria
(C1) and (C2). An upper bound on the maximum number of
identifiable concurrent corrupted areas can consequently be
derived (see the related set packing problem in [30]).
(S4: local identification) Once the corrupted regions have
been identified, the identification method in Section IV is used
to identify the local attack set.
Lemma 4.7: (Local identification) Consider the decoupled
system (28). Assume that the i-th region is under the attack
Ki whereas the neighboring regions N outi are uncorrupted.
Assume that each control center j ∈ N ini transmits the estimate
xˆj(t) and the uncertainty subspace Fi to the i-th control center.
Then, the attack set Ki is identifiable by the i-th control center
if (Ei, Ai, [BbiFi BKi BRi ], Ci, [DKi DRi ]) has no invariant
zeros for any attack set Ri, with |Ri| ≤ |Ki|.
Proof: Notice that each control center j, with j 6= i,
can correctly estimate the state xj(t) modulo Fj . Since
this estimation is transmitted to the i-th control center, the
statement follows from [1, Theorem 3.4].
The final identification procedure (S4) is implemented
only on the corrupted regions. Consequently, the combinato-
rial complexity of our distributed identification procedure is
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Fig. 6. This figure shows a network composed of two subsystems. A control
center is assigned to each subsystem. Each control center knows only the dy-
namics of its local subsystem. The state of the blue nodes {2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15}
is continuously measured by the corresponding control center, and the state
of the red node {3} is corrupted by an attacker. The decoupled identification
procedure presented in Subsection IV-C fails at detecting the attack. Instead,
by means of our cooperative identification procedure, the attack can be
detected and identified via distributed computation.
∑`
i=1
(
ni+pi
|Ki|
)
, where ` is the number of corrupted regions.
Hence, the distributed identification procedure greatly reduces
the combinatorial complexity of the centralized procedure pre-
sented in Subsection IV-B, which requires the implementation
of
(
n+p
|K|
)
filters. Finally, the assumptions of Lemma 4.6 and
Lemma 4.7 clearly improve upon the limitations (L3) and
(L4) of the naive decoupled approach presented in Subsection
IV-C. We conclude this section with an example showing that,
contrary to the limitation (L5) of the naive fully decoupled
approach, boundary attacks Ki ⊆ Kbi can be identified by our
cooperative attack identification method.
Example 2: (An example of cooperative identification)
Consider the sensor network in Fig. 6, where the state of
the blue nodes {2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15} is measured and the state
of the red node {3} is corrupted by an attacker. Assume
that the network evolves according to nonsingular, linear,
time-invariant dynamics. Assume further that the network has
been partitioned into the two areas V1 = {1, . . . , 8} and
V2 = {9, . . . , 16} and at most one area is under attack. Since
{3, 4} are the boundary nodes for the first area, the attack set
K = 3 is neither detectable nor identifiable by the two control
centers via the fully decoupled procedure in Section IV-C.
Consider now the second subsystem with the boundary
nodes Kb2 = {9, 10}. It can be shown that, generically,
the second subsystem with unknown input Bb2f2(t) has no
invariant zeros; see [1, Section V]. Hence, the state of the
second subsystem can be entirely reconstructed. Analogously,
since the attack is on the boundary of the first subsystem, the
state of the first subsystem can be reconstructed, so that the
residual r2(t) is identically zero; see Lemma 4.6.
Suppose that the state of the second subsystem is continu-
ously transmitted to the control center of the first subsystem.
Then, the only unknown input in the first subsystem is due to
the attack, which is now generically detectable and identifiable,
(optional DC link)
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Fig. 7. This figure illustrates the IEEE RTS96 power network [35]. The
dynamics of the generators {101, 102} are affected by an attacker.
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Fig. 8. In this figure we report our simulation results for the case of
linear network dynamics without noise and for the proposed detection monitor
(2) and identification monitor (25), respectively. The state trajectory x(t)
consists of the generators angles and frequencies. The detection residual r(t)
becomes nonzero after time 15s, and it reveals the presence of the attack.
The identification residual rK(t) is identically zero even after time 15s, and
it reveals that the attack set is K = {101, 102}. The identification residual
rR(t) is nonzero after time 15s, and it reveals that R is not the attack set.
since the associated system has no invariant zeros; see Lemma
4.7. We conclude that our cooperative identification procedure
outperforms the decoupled counterpart in Section IV-C. 
V. A CASE STUDY: THE IEEE RTS96 SYSTEM
In this section we apply our centralized attack detection
and identification methods to the IEEE RTS96 power network
[35] illustrated in Fig. 7. In particular, we first consider the
nominal case, in which the power network dynamics evolve as
nominal linear time-invariant descriptor system, as described
in [1, Section II.C]. Second, we consider the case of additive
state and measurement noise, and we show the robustness
of the attack detection and identification monitors. Third, we
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Fig. 9. In this figure we report our simulation results for the case of linear
network dynamics driven by state and measurements noise. For this case,
we choose the output injection matrices of the detection and identification
filters as the corresponding optimal Kalman gain (see Remark 1 and Remark
5). Due to the presence of noise, the residuals deviate from their nominal
behavior reported in Fig. 8. Although the attack is clearly still detectable and
identifiable, additional statistical tools such as hypothesis testing [23] may be
adopted to analyze the residuals r(t), rK(t), and rR(t).
consider the case of nonlinear differential-algebraic power
network dynamics and show the effectiveness of our methods
in the presence of unmodeled nonlinear dynamics.
For our numerical studies, we assume the angles and fre-
quencies of every generator to be measured. Additionally, we
let the attacker affect the angles of the generators {101, 102}
with a random signal starting from time 15s. Since the
considered power network dynamics are of index one, the
filters are implemented using the nonsingular Kron-reduced
system representation [1, Section III.D]. The results of our
simulations are in Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig. 10. In conclusion, our
centralized detection and identification filters appears robust to
state and measurements noise and unmodeled dynamics.
VI. CONCLUSION
For cyber-physical systems modeled by linear time-invariant
descriptor systems, we proposed attack detection and identifi-
cation monitors. In particular, for the detection problem we
developed both centralized and distributed monitors. These
monitors are optimal, in the sense that they detect every
detectable attack. For the attack identification problem, we
developed an optimal centralized monitor and a sub-optimal
distributed method. Our centralized attack identification mon-
itor relies upon a combinatorial machinery. Our distributed
attack identification monitor, instead, is computationally ef-
ficient and achieves guaranteed identification of a class of
attacks, which we characterize. Finally, we provided several
examples to show the effectiveness and the robustness of our
methods against uncertainties and unmodeled dynamics.
APPENDIX
In this section we present an algebraic technique to recon-
struct the state of a descriptor system. Our method builds upon
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Fig. 10. In this figure we report our simulation results for the case of
nonlinear network dynamics without noise. For this case, the detection and
identification filters are designed for the nominal linearized dynamics with
output injection matrices as the corresponding optimal Kalman gain (see
Remark 1 and Remark 5). Despite the presence of unmodeled nonlinear
dynamics, the residuals reflect their nominal behavior reported in Fig. 8.
the results presented in [17]. Consider the descriptor model (1)
written in the form (see [1, Section IV.C])
x˙1(t) = A11x1(t) +A12x2(t) +B1u(t) ,
0 = A21x1(t) +A22x2(t) +B2u(t) ,
y(t) = C1x1(t) + C2x2(t) +Du(t) .
(A-1)
We aim at characterizing the largest subspace of the state space
of (A-1) that can be reconstructed through the measurements
y(t). Consider the associated nonsingular system
˙˜x1(t) = A11x˜1(t) +B1u˜(t) +A12x˜2(t), (A-2)
y˜(t) =
[
y˜1(t)
y˜2(t)
]
=
[
A21
C1
]
x˜1(t) +
[
A22 B2
C2 D
] [
x˜2(t)
u˜(t)
]
.
Recall from [32, Section 4] that the state of the system (A-2)
can be reconstructed modulo its largest controlled invariant
subspace V∗1 contained in the null space of the output matrix.
Lemma 6.1: (Reconstruction of the state x1(t)) Let V∗1 be
the largest controlled invariant subspace of the system (A-2).
The state x1(t) of the system (A-1) can be reconstructed only
modulo V∗1 through the measurements y(t).
Proof: We start by showing that for every x1(0) ∈ V∗1
there exist x2(t) and u(t) such that y(t) is identically zero.
Due to the linearity of (A-1), we conclude that the projection
of x1(t) onto V∗1 cannot be reconstructed. Notice that for every
x˜1(0), x˜2(t), and u˜(t) yielding y˜1(t) = 0 at all times, the state
trajectory [x˜1(t) x˜2(t)] is a solution to (A-1) with input u(t) =
u˜(t) and output y(t) = y˜2(t). Since for every x˜1(0) ∈ V∗1 ,
there exists x˜2(t) and u˜(t) such that y˜(t) is identically zero, we
conclude that every state x1(0) ∈ V∗1 cannot be reconstructed.
We now show that the state x1(t) can be reconstructed
modulo V∗1 . Let x1(0) be orthogonal to V∗1 , and let x1(t),
x2(t), and y(t) be the solution to (A-1) subject to the input
u(t). Notice that x˜1(t) = x1(t), y˜1(t) = 0, and y˜2(t) = y(t)
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is the solution to (A-2) with inputs x˜2(t) = x2(t) and
u˜(t) = u(t). Since x˜1(0) is orthogonal to V∗1 , we conclude
that x˜1(0) = x1(0), and in fact the subspace (V∗)⊥, can be
reconstructed through the measurements y˜2(t) = y(t).
In Lemma 6.1 we show that the state x1(t) of (A-1) can be
reconstructed modulo V∗1 . We now show that the state x2(t)
can generally not be completely reconstructed.
Lemma 6.2: (Reconstruction of the state x2(t)) Let V∗1 =
Im(V1) be the largest controlled invariant subspace of the
system (A-2). The state x2(t) of the system (A-1) can be
reconstructed only modulo V∗2 = A−122 Im([A21V1 B2]).
Proof: Let x1(t) = x¯1(t) + xˆ1(t), where x¯1(t) ∈ V∗1 and
xˆ1(t) is orthogonal to V∗1 . From Lemma 6.1, the signal xˆ1(t)
can be entirely reconstructed via y(t). Notice that
0 = A21x1(t) +A22x2(t) +B2u(t),
= A21V1v1(t) +A21xˆ1(t) +A22x2(t) +B2u(t).
Let W be such that Ker(W ) = Im([A21V1 B2]). Then,
0 = WA21xˆ1(t) + WA22x2(t), and hence x2(t) = x¯2(t) +
xˆ2(t), where xˆ2(t) = (WA22)†WA21xˆ1(t), and x¯2(t) ∈
Ker(WA22) = A
−1
22 Im([A21V1 B2]). The statement follows.
To conclude the paper, we remark the following points.
First, our characterization of V∗1 and V∗2 is equivalent to the
definition of weakly unobservable subspace in [18], and of
maximal output-nulling subspace in [33]. Hence, we proposed
an optimal state estimator for our distributed attack identifi-
cation procedure, and the matrix Vi in (S1: estimation and
communication) can be computed as in [18], [33]. Second, a
reconstruction of x1(t) modulo V∗1 and x2(t) modulo V∗2 can
be obtained through standard algebraic techniques [32]. Third
and finally, Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 extend the results in
[17] by characterizing the subspaces of the state space that
can be reconstructed with an algebraic method by processing
the measurements y(t) and their derivatives.
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